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Abstract. In international  food  markets,  voluntary  traceability  systems  have  increased  
their  role  in  guaranteeing  high  safety  and  quality  standards  for  the  consumer.  Such 
systems   are   also   among   the   strategies   firms   employ   to   differentiate   products   and  
strengthen  competitive advantage  in both  the national  and  international  market.
Voluntary   traceability   has   significant   implications   on   the   organisation   of   economic  
relationships  within  food  supply  chains.  This paper  focuses  on this  aspect  and  analyses  
the  effects  of voluntary  traceability  on  vertical  co- ordination  using  a transaction  cost  
perspective.  The  analysis  makes  reference  to  the  Italian  situation  where  the  national  
standard   organisation   has   introduced   standard   rules   for   voluntary   traceability   (UNI 
10939; ISO 22005  at the international  level).
A survey  was  conducted  by questionnaire  to  assess  changes  in transaction  key factors  
(degree  of asset  specificity,  uncertainty  and  frequency)  and  transaction  costs  after  the  
introduction  of voluntary  traceability.  The  sample  represents  all Italian  firms  certified  
UNI  10939,   and   consists   of   190   firms.   Respondents   are   146.   Factorial   and   Cluster  
Analyses  were  applied  to highlight  groups  of firms  with  similar  features.  The empirical  
results  reveal four  different  clusters  in terms  of a vertical reorganisation  of transactions.
Keywords : traceability, firms’ strategies, transaction  cost  economics, food  chain .
1. Introduction
In the context  of the European  food  policy, traceability systems  have been  
introduced  to improve  the  degree  of food  safety  in food  supply  chains.  A 
“comprehensive  and  integrated  approach”  to food  safety  policy, provided  
by  the  European  Commission  (2000)  in  the  White  Paper  (6), has  led  to 
mandatory  traceability  for  the  beef  sector  (Reg. 1760/2000)  and  for  all 
other  agri- food  products  (Reg. 178/2002).
The   improvement   in   food   safety   due   to   the   traceability   system   is 
connected   to   the   growth   of   information   throughout   the   food   supply  
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The paper  presents  the  results  of a survey  on  voluntary  traceability  conducted  in Italy. 
The results  concerning  the  meat  sector  were  presented  at the  99 th EAAE seminar  “Trust  
and  Risk in Business  Networks”  (8- 10  February,  2006,  Bonn) and  those  concerning  the  
dairy sector  were presented  at the “7th International  Conference  on Management  in Agri-
food  Chains  and  Networks” (31 May -  02 June, 2006, Ede- Wageningen).
2chain, and  to the  attribution  of specific liabilities  to agents  of the  supply  
chain (2, 3).
In addition  to mandatory  traceability it is possible, in the  EU, to outline  a 
second  traceability system  level which  is voluntary,  and  which  provides  a 
higher   degree   of   information   associated   to   a   single   product.   This 
voluntary   traceability   system   is   regulated   by  a   number   of   European  
organizations  accredited  to  deliver  food  safety  standards,  like  AFNOR 
(Association  Française  de  Normalisation)  in France,  BSI (British  Standard  
Institute)  in the  United  Kingdom,  UNI (National  Standards  Organization) 
in  Italy.  Recently,  within  the  framework  of  ISO 22000/2005,  a  specific 
voluntary   traceability   standard   has   been   designed   also   at   the 
international  level (15).
This  paper  concerns  the  application  of a voluntary  traceability  system  in 
Italy, where  the  Italian  standard  organization  has  set  down  specific rules  
for   such   a   system   (UNI  10939/2001).   A  survey   was   conducted   by   a 
questionnaire  to  all  firms  certified  UNI 10939/2001  operating  in  food  
processing. 
The  paper  analyses   the  effects  of  introducing  a  voluntary  traceability 
system   within   the   organization   of   economic   relationships   throughout  
Italian  food  chains.  We utilized  the  theoretical  approach  of  transaction  
cost   economics  (27)  in   order   to   test   whether   traceability   can   lead   to 
variation  in the degree  of vertical co- ordination.
The   paper   is   organised   as   follows:   the   economic   implications   of 
traceability  and  the  theoretical  framework  of transaction  cost  economics  
are  examined  in section  2; the  survey  conducted  and  the  methodological  
issues  are examined  in section  3; the results  are analysed  in section  4 and  
the concluding  evidence  is set out in section  5.
2. Traceability  and transaction  costs
2.1. Concepts  and features  of traceability  systems
In general, the  definition  of traceability  refers  to the  ability to trace, and  
follow,   a   food   product   throughout   all   the   stages   of   its   production,  
processing  and  distribution  (15,   20). Thus,  traceability  is connected  to  an 
information  procedure  aimed  at following a product  along its food  supply  
chain.
Following  Golan  et  al.(7)  the  main  characteristics  of  traceability  systems  
depend  on  their  breadth,  depth,  and  precision.  Breadth  represents  the  
amount   of   information   the   traceability   system   can   record;   depth  
describes  which sectors  are involved  in the food  supply chain; precision  is 
associated   with   tracking   unit   dimension;   indeed,   large   analysis   units  
result  in poor  precision.  Therefore,  different  kinds  of traceability systems  
can  be distinguished,  depending  on  the  amount  of information  recorded  
and  the tracking  unit.
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these  depending  on  product  flow management  in the  different  stages  of 
the   supply   chain   (precision)   and   on   the   amount   of   the   information  
recorded  (breadth):
- supply chain traceability system ,
- supply chain and product traceability system .
Supply  chain  traceability is based  on  an  information  procedure  aimed  at 
identifying   the   economic   agents   of   the   supply   chain.   This   system   is 
mandatory  and  is regulated  by Reg. 178/2002,  where,  in article  18, it is 
established  that  at  all stages  of production,  processing  and  distribution  
the  operators  shall  be able  to  identify  any  person  from  whom  they  buy 
products   and   other   operators   to   whom   they   sell   products.   For   this 
purpose  the  operators  have  to  implement  procedures  which  allow  the  
availability of this information  to the competent  authorities.
The  main  purpose  of this  system  is to  improve  the  food  product  safety  
level. This is achieved  by growth  in the information  level along the supply  
chain,  and  better  liability  distribution  to  the  agents  of the  supply  chain. 
However, in this  system  the  information  is not  associated  with  a specific 
product  and  it is not possible to design  the history  of the single product.
Instead , supply  chain  and  product  traceability  is a much  more  complex  
system.   It   is   characterized   by   the   management   of   raw   materials   and  
products  in separate  batches,  and  by procedures  that  attribute  specific 
information  to each  single batch.  Management  by separate  batches  is laid 
down  in both  the  company  processing  and  in the  transactions  among  the  
economic  agents  in the supply chain (2).
The   separation,   and  the  identification,  of  single  batches  with  specific 
codes  is  carried  out  at  two  specific  moments  in  the  firm  production  
process: at storage  or at the arrival of raw materials, and  at the packaging  
or the storing  when  the products  are ready to be exchanged  (21).
The  system  is applied  in the  beef  sector  by Reg. 1760/2000  (23), but  for 
other  food  products  its  adoption  is  voluntary,  representing  a strategic  
choice  of  the  firms.  Therefore,  excluding  the  beef  sector,  there  are  two 
levels of traceability in the  EU: the  general  mandatory  traceability system  
provided  by Reg. 178/2002  (supply  chain  traceability)  and,  at  a second  
level,   a   voluntary   traceability   system   (supply   chain   and   product  
traceability) which makes  reference  to national  or international  standards.
Examples   of   traceability   standards   are   AFNOR   V01   020   (“Lignes 
directrices  pour  l’établissement  d’une  démarche  de  traçabilité  dans  les 
filières   agricoles   et   alimentaires”)   and   the   BSI  85:2000   (“A   quality 
management  system  to  ensure  the  integrity  and  traceability  of  primary  
products  in  the  agri- food  chain”).  Moreover  the  International  standard  
organization  recently  outlined  specific standards  for  traceability  through  
the rules  ISO 22005:2005.
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introduced  by the National  standards  organization  (UNI). Italian voluntary  
traceability  allows  the  reconstruction  of  a specific  product’s  history  all 
along  the  supply  chain.  Thus,  compared  to  mandatory  traceability,  the 
system  results  in a higher  degree  of  increased  information  and  a more  
specific allocation  of liabilities.
2.2. Economic  implications  of voluntary  traceability
The economic  effects  on firms  of the  traceability system  provided  by UNI 
10939/2001  mainly concern  three  aspects:  food  safety, food  quality, and  
vertical co- ordination  in the food  supply chain.
Referring  to food  safety implications  (18, 25), voluntary  traceability, given its 
specific production  rules  and  controls, allows a higher  level of safety than  
mandatory   traceability.   Indeed,   in   the   case   of   food   contamination,  
separate  batches  management  within  the  firms  part  of the  traced  supply  
chain  allows  an  efficient  organisation  of  material  flow,  and  the  firm  is 
able to withdraw  only the tainted  batches.  Thus, voluntary  traceability can  
lead  to  a reduction  in recall  expenses  and  the  attribution  of  liability  to 
specific agents  of the traced  supply chain.
Food   quality   implications   connected   to   the   introduction   of   voluntary  
traceability refer  mainly to the  guaranteeing  of quality standards  for food  
products  (14), due  to  the  fact  that  the  firms  of  the  supply  chains  adopt  
specific production  rules  and  implement  specific controls. 
With   regard   to   the   effect   of   voluntary   traceability   on   vertical   co-
ordination  (2),  the   system   leads   to   the   reorganisation   of   the   vertical 
relationships  along the food  supply chain connected  to:
- the   implementation   of   specific   agreements,   called  supply   chain  
agreements ,
- centralisation of the traceability system  management.
Supply   chain   agreements   represent   a   new   form   of   governance   for 
transactions  within  the  supply  chain,  providing  specific production  rules  
for food  safety  and  product  quality. Moreover, the  agreement   establishes  
procedures   for   recording   product   batch   information   and   assigning  
specific liability to the supply chain agents. 
The centralization  of the  management  of the  traceability system  is due  to 
the  fact  that  a  firm  supports  the  introduction  of  traceability  into  the  
supply  chains.  This  firm  then  acts  as  the  leader  of  the  supply  chain, 
coordinating  the  activities  of  the  other  agents,  and  is in  charge  of  the 
certification   of   the   system.   Thus,   the   design   of   the   supply   chain  
agreement,   the   management   of   information   and   the   planning   of   the 
controls   are   centered   in   this   firm.   Therefore,   the   introduction   of   a 
voluntary  traceability system  leads  to a centralized  mode  of organization  
for  the  activities  within  the  supply  chain  (17). In our  survey  we considered  
only  firms  operating  in  the  food  industry  in  Italy  as  leaders,  but  the  
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agricultural  cooperative. 
The reorganization  of the  vertical  relationships  in the  food  supply  chain  
is related  to the changes  in the characteristics  and  costs  of transaction,  as 
underlined  in the  next  section,  considering  that  the  level of transaction  
uncertainty  decreases  while the  bilateral  dependency  of the  agents  of the  
chain grows  (9).
Voluntary  traceability  is a choice  made  by both  the  leader  firm  and  the  
other  economic  agents  of the  food  supply  chain, thus  the  introduction  of 
the   system   depends   on   the   advantages   the   firms   will   achieve.   Such 
advantages  are  connected  to  improvement  in  food  safety  and  quality, 
premium   prices,   brand   image   of   high   value   traced   products,   the  
expansion  of  sales,  efficiency  in  distribution,  reduction  of  recall  costs, 
and  adaptation  to the  standards  required  by retailers  at the  international  
level (7).
Thus,   the   advantages   of   voluntary   traceability   can   regard   both   the 
business  to  consumer  relationship  and  that  of business  to  business.  At 
the  single  firm  level an assessment  is needed  of whether  the  advantages  
of  introducing   voluntary   traceability   exceed   its   relative   costs   (cost   of 
implementing  the  management  of separate  batches,  cost  of information  
procedures,  and  so on). 
2.3. The transaction  cost  approach
After   introducing   a   voluntary   traceability   system   like   the   UNI  10939  
standard,  more  transparent  and  efficient  vertical  relationships  can  be 
achieved  through  a reorganisation  of  the  material  and  informative  flow 
along  supply  chains.  Thus  to analyse  the  voluntary  traceability effects  on 
supply   chain   co- ordination   we   utilised   the   theoretical   framework   of 
transaction   cost   economics,   and   tried   to   verify   whether   the 
implementation   of   this   food   safety   instrument   would   lead   to   any 
variation  in the transaction  characteristics  and  costs  of transacting.
Transaction  costs  are  present  within  a market,  in a vertically  integrated  
firm  (28),  and   in   “all   the   ways   of   harmonising   the   vertical   stages   of 
production  and  marketing” (9, 19), because  of market  failure  associated  with 
information   asymmetry   among   economic   agents  (1).   According   to 
Williamson’s  theory,  economic  subjects  conduct  vertical  relationships  by 
trying to minimise  the costs  involved  in transactions  (5).
There  are  different  kinds  of transaction  costs,  depending  on  when  they  
arise in the transaction.  Information  or search  costs  arise  ex ante, and  are 
related  to the level of transaction  transparency  and  the limited  rationality  
of economic  agents  within  a market.  Negotiating  costs  take  place  during  
transactions,   and   are   mainly   connected   to   the   difficulty   in   settling  
agreements.  Monitoring  and  enforcement  costs  occur  after  the  exchange  
has   been   negotiated,   and   are   correlated   to   the   level   of   bilateral  
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necessary  to respect  the conditions  of transactions  (10).
Williamson  (27,   28)  states  that  the  consequent  governance  of  transactions  
depends  on  transaction  costs  and  on  some  key  transaction  factors:  the 
level   of   asset   specificity,   the   level   of   uncertainty   surrounding   the 
transactions  and  the  degree  of frequency.  In particular,  he  distinguishes  
three   possible   forms   of   transaction   governance:   market,   hybrid   and  
hierarchy.  The  use  of  one  of  these  three  forms  depends  mainly  on  the 
level of asset  specificity of transactions  (22).
The   asset   specificity   of   transactions   is   correlated   to   the   bilateral  
dependency  of economic  agents,  due  to the resources  invested  to conduct  
transactions.  Transaction  costs,  and  the  need  to  safeguard  transactions  
through  more  formal  vertical  co- ordination  alternatives,  increase  as  the 
degree  of transaction  asset  specificity increases  (29).
The level of uncertainty  depends  on the degree  of information  asymmetry  
among  economic  agents,  on the random  nature  of some  events  and  on the  
bounded   rationality   of   subjects  (1).   It   is   strictly   connected   to   the  
probability that  subjects  will respect  contractual  obligations.
However,  the  level  of  transaction  uncertainty  affects  only  conditionally 
the  transaction  governance,  that  depends  mainly  on  the  degree  of asset  
specificity  (27). If, for  example,  the  level  of  bilateral  dependency  among  
economic  agents  is low, the  degree  of transaction  uncertainty  will not  be 
important  in choosing  the  transaction  arrangements.  In this  case, market  
governance  should  be  preferred  to  hybrid  forms  or  vertical  integration  
despite  the  degree  of transaction  uncertainty  (11). On the  contrary,  if asset  
specificity   increases,   the   level   of   transaction   uncertainty   will   become  
important  to the choice of the transaction  governance  structure.  In such  a 
case,   the   higher   the   level   of   transaction   uncertainty,   the   higher   the  
probability  that  the  subjects  will choose  hybrid  governance  or  hierarchy  
to conduct  the transactions.
With  reference  to  Williamson’s  theoretical  framework,  our  hypothesis  is 
that  implementing  a voluntary  traceability  system  leads  to  a growth  in 
transaction   asset   specificity,   a   decrease   in   the   degree   of   transaction  
uncertainty  and  variation  in transaction  costs.  Thus  it can  be  expected  
that  there  will be an increase  in monitoring  costs  due  to growth  in asset  
specificity   for   the   implementation   of   the   system,   and   a   reduction   in 
information  costs  due  to the  reduction  in information  asymmetry  among  
economic  subjects  (2, 3).
These   variations   in   transaction   characteristics   and   costs   lead   to   a 
reorganisation  of  transactions  based  on  supply  chain  agreements . This 
new  hybrid  transaction  form  increases  the  degree  of  control  between  
buyers  (food  processing  firms  in this  case) and  sellers  (agricultural  raw 
material  suppliers)  and  leads  to  changes  in the  vertical  organisation  of 
transactions.  According  to  Williamson,  in formulating  these  agreements  
the   subjects   can   decide   whether   to   introduce   economic   incentives, 
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contractual  support  (31).
3. Data and method
A survey was conducted  during  the  spring  and  summer  of 2005, in order  
to   test   changes   in   the   vertical   relations   after   the   introduction   of   a 
voluntary  traceability system.
The  sample  represents  all  Italian  firms  certified  UNI 10939,  which  are 
specialized   in   food   processing.   The   questionnaire   consisted   of   30 
questions  subdivided  into three  parts.
Part  1  contains  questions  relating  to  the  general  characteristics  of  the  
company,   paying   particular   attention   to   its   legal   shape,   turnover,  
employees,   level   of   vertical   co- ordination,   certification   systems   and  
motivations  to introduce  voluntary  traceability.
Part  2  focuses  on  the  changes  verified  in  the  transaction  key  factors  
following  the  introduction  of the  standard,  UNI 10939.  The demands  are 
related  to the  variation  in asset  specificity of the  transaction  (changes  in 
site,   physical,   intangible   and   human   assets)   and   the   variation   in   the  
uncertainty  degree  of  transactions,  in terms  of  frequency,  quantity  and  
accuracy of information  exchanged.
Part   3   is   aimed   at   defining   the   variation   in   the   transaction   costs  
associated  with the introduction  of the voluntary  system  (UNI 10939), and  
especially considers  monitoring  costs  as the exact quantification  of all the 
transaction  costs  is extremely  complex  due  to  the  many  organisational  
costs  that  are not measurable.
Monitoring  costs  are  quantified  by  means  of  questions  relative  to  the 
variation   in   both   the   supplier   activity   controls   and   the   raw   material 
controls.
A multiple  choice,  rating- scale  format  was  used  to  obtain  answers  as 
numerical variables  (16).
The   sample   consisted   of   190   firms   certified   UNI   10939,   and   the 
respondents  were  146.  Most  are  concentrated  in  four  sectors:  21% of 
those  interviewed  are specialised  in meat  processing,  25% in the  fruit  and  
vegetable  sector, 22% in the diary sector  and  12% in the wine industry.
We   applied   factor   analysis   and   then   cluster   analysis   to   identify 
homogeneous  groups  of firms  in terms  of different  approach  to voluntary  
traceability.  Carrying  out  factor  analysis  before  cluster  analysis  reduced  
the number  of variables  and  highlighted  significant  factors.
Principal  Component  Analysis  (PCA) for  21 variables  was  used  to extract  
the   factors  (8).   This   is   a   linear   transformation   of   the   variables   that  
assumes  those  factors  able to explain  all the variance  in each variable.
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account   for  66%  of   total   variance.   Orthogonal   rotation   (Varimax)   was 
carried  out  after  the initial extraction  of the factors.  The factors  produced  
by SPSS were used  for cluster  analysis.
For   Cluster   analysis   we   utilized   a   hierarchical   approach.   Similarity 
between  cases  was  measured  by Pearson’s  correlation,  and  the  between-
groups  linkage method  was used  to combine  nearest  clusters  into broader  
groups.  This  technique  led  to  the  identification  of 4 clusters  that  seem  
the  best  results  in terms  of  some  important  criteria,  like  the  minimum  
number   of   firms   for   each   cluster;   the   degree   of   distances   between  
clusters  (small  coefficients  indicate  the  merging  of  fairly  homogeneous  
clusters,  whereas  large coefficients  indicate  that  clusters  containing  quite  
dissimilar  members  are being combined)  and  the  different  characteristics  
of the resulting  clusters.
4. Results
4.1. General evidence  of the survey
The main  reasons  related  to the  introduction  of voluntary  traceability  in 
the   food   supply   chain   were   the   assurance   of   product   quality 
characteristics  (76%) and  the  introduction  of  a  correct  liability  system  
among  supply  chain  participants  (65%). Among  those  interviewed  54% 
introduced  traceability to enhance  communication  among  subjects  part  of 
the  supply  chain, and  51% of the  firms  stated  that  traceability represents  
an important  standard  to guarantee  food  safety (figure 1).
The sample  consists  of both  big and  small firms: 45% have  a turnover  of 
less than  10 million  Euro, 23% between  10 and  25, 13% between  25 and  50 
and  19% higher  than  50  million.  Most  of the  firms  show  a high  level of 
vertical   co- ordination.   The   results   reveal   that   40%  of   the   firms   are 
vertically integrated,  the  most  of which  are co- operatives,  18% own some  
agricultural  farms  and  43% have  no  farm  ownership.  It was  found  that  
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9Figure 1. Level of agreement  of firms  regarding  motivation  in implementing  voluntary  
traceability
Source: own survey
Table 1. Firms  and  traced  supply  chains  characteristics
n. % n. % n. % n. % n. % n. %
Turnover (000.000 euro)
<1 13 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 13 8,9
1-10 29 54,7 17 32,1 2 3,8 1 1,9 4 7,5 53 36,3
10-25 11 32,4 10 29,4 10 29,4 3 8,8 0 0,0 34 23,3
25-50 3 15,8 4 21,1 5 26,3 5 26,3 2 10,5 19 13,0
50-100 0 0,0 0 0,0 2 40,0 2 40,0 1 20,0 5 3,4
>100 0 0,0 1 4,5 1 4,5 3 13,6 17 77,3 22 15,1
Legal shape
Private firms 40 41,2 18 18,6 14 14,4 11 11,3 14 14,4 97 66,4
Cooperatives 16 32,7 14 28,6 6 12,2 3 6,1 10 20,4 49 33,6
Level of vertical integration
Low 27 43,5 11 17,7 10 16,1 7 11,3 7 11,3 62 42,5
High 6 23,1 6 23,1 4 15,4 4 15,4 6 23,1 26 17,8
Very high 23 39,7 15 25,9 6 10,3 3 5,2 11 19,0 58 39,7
Total 56 38,4 32 21,9 20 13,7 14 9,6 24 16,4 146 100,0
Employees
Firms characterisitics
>150 Total <20 20-50 50-100 100-150
Source: own survey
With regard  to the  characteristics  of the  traced  supply  chains,  43% of the  
interviewed  firms  implemented  the  voluntary  system  in the  agricultural  
sector  and  in food  processing,  24% extended  traceability  to  agricultural  
input  sector,  agricultural  sector  and  food  processing,  and  33% included  
also  distribution.   Almost  25% of the  firms  limited  the  application  of the  
voluntary  traceability  to 20% of their  agricultural  suppliers,  whereas  35% 
included  all  the  suppliers  in  their  traceability  system.  The  other  firms  
implemented  it on 20% to 80% of their  chain’s suppliers  (figure 2).
Most  of the  big firms  extended  the  voluntary  traceability system  to only 
part  of the  sectors  and  subjects  involved  in the  chain,  whereas  a lot  of 
small firms  decided  to improve  their  voluntary  traceability by applying  it 
to   all   the   sectors   and   the   agents   of   the   supply   chain.   The   different  
implementation  strategies  of the  small  and  big firms  depend  mainly  on 
the  costs  involved  in applying  the  voluntary  traceability  standard , which 
are definitely influenced  by the firms  dimensions.
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Figure 2. The characteristics  of traced  supply  chains
Source: our survey
The survey underlines  an increase  in the level of human,  physical, 
intangible and  site asset  specificity. The results  show that  (table 2):
Table  2. Firms’ perceptions  about  the  effects  of  voluntary  traceability  on  transaction  
characteristics, costs  and  vertical co- ordination
Low Medium High Very high Total
Asset specificity variation
1) Human asset specificity variation
      Long business relations with suppliers 4.8 8.2 24.0 63.0 100.0
      Difficulty in substitution of suppliers 32.2 19.9 20.5 27.4 100.0
      Traning of suppliers 7.5 11.0 34.2 47.3 100.0
2) Physical asset specificity variation
      Processing facilities variation (*) 62.3 37.7 100.0
3) Geographical asset specificity variation
      Certified suppliers closeness 8.9 21.2 35.6 34.2 100.0
4) Intangible asset specificity variation
      Certification (**) 69.9 22.6 4.8 2.7 100.0
      Implementation (**) 81.5 11.6 4.1 2.7 100.0
Uncertainty variation
      Frequency of  information flow variation 10.2 6.8 27.2 55.8 100.0
      Quantity of information flow variation 7.5 8.2 15.8 68.5 100.0
      Precision of information flow variation 9.6 4.1 24.7 61.6 100.0
Transaction costs variation
Monitoring costs variation
      Suppliers activity controls variation 13.0 2.7 31.5 52.7 100.0
      Raw materials controls variation 22.6 8.2 32.2 37.0 100.0
Proxies of vertical relationships variation
     Raw materials price variation (*) 71.9 28.1 100.0
     Liability degree variation  5.5 9.6 25.3 59.6 100.0
     Production rules enforcement 17.8 21.2 27.4 33.6 100.0
Source: our survey
(1) Questionnaire answers are scored from 1(low) to 4 (very high)
(*) Answer options are yes (2=high) or no (1=low)
(**) low <20.000 euro; medium 20.000-50.000 euro; high 50.000-100.000 euro; very high >100.000 euro
Variation of transaction characteristics (%)
Source: own survey
11a) a  long  term  business  relationship  is  an  important  factor  to  decide  
which suppliers  can be part  of a traced  supply chain (87% of answers);
b) the substitution  of certified  suppliers  is more  difficult  than  for normal  
suppliers  (48%);
c) most  of  the  participants  involved  in the  certified  supply  chain  have 
undergone  specific training  (82%);
d) the  implementation  of the voluntary  traceability system  requires  some  
material investment  (38%);
e) most  of the certified  suppliers  are located  near  the firm  (70%);
f) investments,  though  not  very high, are needed  for certification  and  the  
implementing  of the system.
A decrease  in the  uncertainty  degree  throughout  the  supply  chain  is also 
observed.  Firms  interviewed  have  recorded  an  increase  in the  frequency  
(83%), quantity  (84%) and  precision  (86%) of information  flow.
Moreover,   the   firms  show  an  increase   in  monitoring   costs   to  control  
supplier  activities  (84% of answers) and  raw materials  (69%).
4.2. Factorial and cluster  analysis
Factor  analysis  was  applied  to  summarise  the  important  variables  that  
can explain  the organisational  changes  within  the  food  supply  chain  after  
the  introduction  of  a  voluntary  traceability  system.  The  rotated  factor  
matrix  was  calculated  to  permit  the  interpretation  of  the  eight  factors  
(table 3).
The  first  factor  explains  the  information  expressed  by  the  variation  of 
intangible  assets  and  the  characteristics  of the  firms  i.e. the  costs  of the 
certification  (0.868) and  management  (0.835) of the  voluntary  system  and  
the  number  of  employees  (0.497).  The  second  factor  are  the  variables  
describing  the  level of the  firms’ vertical  co- ordination  variation,  i.e. the  
legal shape  (0.891) and  the  level of vertical  integration  (0.883). The third  
factor  explains  the  variation  in  the  uncertainty  degree  of  transactions,  
and   in   the   physical   asset   specificity,   after   the   introduction   of   the  
voluntary  traceability  system,  i.e. the  increase  in the  quantity  (0.849) and  
accuracy   (0.679)   of   information   flow   and   the   introduction   of   new 
processing  facilities  (0.490).  The  fourth  factor  is  mainly  connected  to 
variables  explaining  the  variation  of transaction  safeguard  conditions,  i.e. 
production   rules   enforcement   (0.811)   and   agents’   liability   conditions  
(0.568)  after  the  introduction  of the  supply  chain  agreements.  The  fifth  
factor  summarises  the  information  connected  to the  monitoring  costs, i.e. 
supplier  activity  (0.844) and  raw  material  control  variations  (0.758). The 
sixth   factor   explains   variation   in   final   product   price   (0,848)   and   raw 
material  price  (0.633), whereas  the seventh  factor  represents  the  human  
asset   specificity   variation   (the   variable   explaining   long   business  
relationships   is   0.752).   The   last   factor   summarises   the   firms’   sector  
(0.772) and  the  site asset  specificity variation  (0.649), i.e. the  closeness  of 
certified  suppliers.
12Cluster  analysis  (CA) applied  to the  above  described  components  reveals  
the  presence  of four  groups  of firms.  These  groups  differ,  one  from  the  
other,  in terms  of the  firms’ characteristics  and  the  voluntary  traceability 
effects  on vertical  co- ordination.  Each cluster  is composed  by firms  that  
chose   different   organisational   solutions   to   promote   continuity   and  
safeguard  transactions.
To facilitate  the  interpretation  of the  clusters  we calculated  the  average  
factorial  coefficients  of  the  firms  in  each  cluster  for  each  component  
(figure 3).
The first  cluster  is composed  by 45 small firms,  most  of which  used  oral 
agreements  for  the  exchange  of raw  materials  before  the  introduction  of 
the  traceability  system.  Some  of  them  are  private  vertically  integrated  
firms   and   produce   their   own   raw   materials  (the   level   of   vertical   co-
ordination   is   0.31).   These   firms   state   that   the   quality   assurance   of 
products  has  been  an important  element  for the introduction  of voluntary  
traceability   as   they   have   no   other   quality   certification   systems.   The 
voluntary  system  is extended  almost  to  all the  suppliers  of agricultural  
raw material (60%-80% of suppliers).
The  firms  grouped  in this  cluster  (cluster  1), which  is explained  by the  
factor   of   safeguards   variation   (0.61),   register   an   augmentation   of 
monitoring  costs  (0.40) and  a reduction  in information  costs  thanks  to a 
slight   increase   in   transaction   transparency   (0.19).   The   increase   in 
monitoring   costs   and   the   absence   of   formal   agreements   lead   to   the  
introduction   of   new   contractual   supports   (0.61)   between   economic  
agents,  like  liability  variations  and  production  rules  enforcement.  Thus, 
an increase  in vertical co- ordination  among  agents  is observed.
Table 3. Rotated  component  matrix
13Intangible 
























Employees 0.497 0.233 -0.293 0.056 -0.044 -0.012 0.262 -0.367
Legal shape -0.141 0.891 0.051 -0.018 0.105 -0.067 -0.002 0.114
Sector 0.071 0.098 -0.047 -0.122 -0.043 -0.141 0.065 0.772
level of vertical integration 0.027 0.883 0.013 -0.023 -0.101 -0.091 -0.118 0.147
contracts formalisation 0.193 0.294 0.158 -0.447 0.037 0.371 0.388 -0.031
final product price variation 0.024 0.053 -0.062 0.036 0.102 0.848 0.033 -0.136
% of traced suppliers 0.025 0.152 0.145 0.041 0.003 -0.316 -0.695 -0.194
Asset specificity variation
1) Human asset specificity variation
      Long business relations with suppliers -0.151 -0.040 0.181 0.151 -0.046 -0.032 0.752 -0.119
      Traning of suppliers 0.200 -0.045 0.154 0.315 0.385 -0.225 0.152 0.073
2) Physical asset specificity variation
      Processing facilities variation 0.429 -0.065 0.490 -0.093 0.057 -0.097 0.239 0.049
3) Geographical asset specificity variation
      Certified suppliers closeness -0.289 0.294 -0.107 0.117 0.047 -0.001 -0.040 0.649
4) Intangible asset specificity variation
      Certification 0.868 -0.076 0.115 -0.026 0.039 -0.018 -0.124 0.043
      Implementation 0.835 -0.064 -0.036 0.098 -0.029 0.040 -0.127 -0.112
Uncertainty variation
      Frequency of  information flow variation 0.040 -0.044 0.215 0.473 0.188 0.383 0.008 0.151
      Quantity of information flow variation -0.042 0.046 0.849 0.020 0.093 0.114 -0.059 0.000
      Precision of information flow variation 0.028 0.081 0.679 0.355 0.162 -0.042 0.140 -0.269
Transaction costs variation
Monitoring and enforcement costs variation
Cost of implementing the system 0.868 -0.076 0.115 -0.026 0.039 -0.018 -0.124 0.043
Cost of managing the system 0.835 -0.064 -0.036 0.098 -0.029 0.040 -0.127 -0.112
      Suppliers activity controls variation 0.051 0.038 0.019 0.073 0.844 0.150 0.045 0.061
      Raw materials controls variation -0.097 -0.022 0.140 -0.116 0.758 0.030 -0.139 -0.096
Proxies of vertical relationships variation
     Raw materials price variation -0.053 -0.246 0.082 0.076 -0.010 0.633 0.142 -0.040
     Liability degree variation  -0.016 0.055 0.151 0.568 0.367 0.043 0.346 -0.043
     Production rules enforcement 0.054 -0.008 -0.001 0.811 -0.180 0.079 -0.010 -0.110
Source: our survey
The  second  cluster,  which  is explained  by the  factor  of  sector  and  site 
asset  specificity  variation  (1.10), consists  of 23  firms.  Most  of these  are 
small co- operatives  with  an annual  turnover  of less  than  10 million  Euro 
and  an average  number  of 25 employees.  Almost  all these  firms  belong  to 
the  wine  industry,  show  no  increase  in  human  asset  specificity  (-0.27) 
and   do   not   register   a   greater   quantity   and   precision   of   exchanged  
information  (-0.37).  The  firms  grouped  in  this  cluster  have  no  quality  
certification  systems  like  ISO 9000  or  PDO certification,  and  utilise  the 
voluntary   system   to   implement   a   quality   standard   management   for 
production   through   the   introduction   of   specific   suppliers   and   raw 
material  controls  (the  factor  representing  monitoring  costs  is  0.45).  In 
accordance  with Williamson’s theoretical framework,  the firms  grouped  in 
this  cluster  do  not  report  any  variation  in vertical  co- ordination;  this  is 
because  their  transactions  are already  internally safeguarded  and  there  is 
no   need   for   any   strengthening   of   transaction   governance   through  
economic  incentives  (-0.59)  or  contractual  support  (-0.79), although  an 
increase  in monitoring  costs  is observed.
The third  cluster  groups  48 medium  firms  not vertically integrated  (-0.31) 
that  use  contracts  for  exchanges.  Most  of them  state  that  the  reason  for  
implementing   the   voluntary   system   is   mainly   connected   to   the   right  
attribution   of   liabilities   among   the   economic   subjects   of   the   supply  
chains.  Thus,  the  traceability  system  is extended  to  most  of the  chain’s 
14suppliers  (40%-60%). In this case, the introduction  of a traceability system  
determines  a reduction  in the  transaction  uncertainty  degree  (0.49), and  
an   increase   in   intangible   (0.59)   and   human   (0.16)   asset   specificity. 
Monitoring  costs  do not register  a positive variation  (-0.69). In this cluster  
no   economic   incentives   (0.06)   or   contractual   safeguards   (-0.18)   are 
introduced   to   safeguard  the   higher  bilateral  dependency  of  economic  
subjects  after  specific  investments,  because  transactions  become  more  
transparent  due  to the  voluntary  system  and  the  probability of situations  
of moral  hazard  or adverse  selection  is reduced.  In most  of the  firms  in 
this  cluster  the  increase  in the  supply  chain  transparency  is sufficient  to 
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Figure 3. Average of factorial coefficients  in each cluster
Source: our survey
15The  firms  grouped  in  the  fourth  cluster  are  30,  of  big  dimension,  and  
have  more  than  100  employees.  All the  interviewees  use  contracts  for 
vertical  exchanges,  and  state  that  the  reason  for  the  implementation  of 
the   voluntary   system   is   mainly   to   enhance   the   quality   attributes   of 
products.  Thus, the standard  is applied  to only a few suppliers  (20%-40%), 
particularly   to   those   that   can   guarantee  respect   for   the   quality  rules  
established  in the  supply  chain  agreements.  All the  firms  grouped  in this  
cluster  already  have   other   quality  certification  systems,  and  can  take  
advantage   of   the   synergies   for   the   implementation   of   the   voluntary  
traceability.  For  this  reason  these  firms  do  not  show  any  variation  in 
intangible  assets  (-0.28), and  the  uncertainty  degree  remains  the  same  
(-0.79)  whereas  the  level  of  human  asset  specificity  reveals  a  positive  
variation   (0.45).   In  this  case   the   increase  in   asset   specificity  and  the  
invariance  of the  level of transaction  uncertainty  lead  to the  adoption  of 
economic  incentives  in order  to  safeguard  transactions  (0.92)  from  the 
opportunistic  behaviour  of economic  agents.
5 Concluding  remarks  
The  empirical  analysis  of  the  Italian  traced  supply  chains  has  revealed  
that  the  firms’ purposes  for the  introduction  of voluntary  traceability are 
multiple,  but  two motives  are  particularly  significant:  an improvement  in 
food  quality  standards  due  to  the  introduction  of production  rules  and  
controls   for   the   agents   of   the   supply   chain,   and   a   better   liabilities  
attribution   among   the   participants   of   the   supply   chain   through   the  
introduction  of  a  system  that  connects  information  flow  with  product  
batches.
Moreover,   cluster   analysis   has   revealed   the   presence   of   different  
organisational   solutions   connected   to   the   introduction   of   voluntary  
traceability.  According  to  the  transaction  costs  approach,  this  voluntary  
standard  leads  to  an  increase  in  asset  specificity  (intangible,  physical, 
human  and  site asset  specificity) of transactions.
This   positive   variation   can   lead   firms   to   choose   different   types   of 
transactions  governance  depending  on:
- the  degree  of  uncertainty  of  transactions  after  the  introduction  of 
voluntary  traceability
- the level of the firms’ vertical co- ordination.
Referring   to   the   uncertainty   degree,   firms   that   assist   in   increased  
informative  transparency  (like firms  grouped  in the  third  cluster)  do  not  
lead  to  any  reorganisation  of  vertical  relations  although  an  increase  in 
bilateral  dependency  between  economic  agents  is observed.  In accordance  
with  Williamson’s  theory,  the  reduction  of  the  transaction  uncertainty  
degree  reduces  the  risk  of contractual  infringements.  In such  a situation  
subjects  do  not  increase  the  level  of  vertical  co- ordination  in order  to 
ensure  the correct  execution  of agreement  conditions.
16The   growth   in   information   transparency   is   connected   to   the  
implementation   of  the   voluntary  system  on   most  of   the   suppliers   of 
agricultural  raw material.
On the  other  hand,  if the  level of uncertainty  remains  the  same  and  the  
level  of  asset  specificity  increases  (like  in the  first  and  fourth  clusters)  
variations  in the  organisation  of transactions  are  observed.  According  to 
Williamson’s  contracting  scheme,  economic  incentives  (cluster  4) or more  
stringent   contractual   safeguards   (cluster   1)   are   established  for   traced  
suppliers.  In this case the firms  extend  the voluntary  traceability to only a 
part  of their suppliers.
Finally, referring  to  the  relation  between  the  variation  in the  transaction  
governance  and  the  level  of  the  firms’  vertical  co- ordination,  we  can  
outline  three  different  situations:
- firms  that  used  oral  agreements  before  the  introduction  of voluntary  
traceability   show   an   increase   in   vertical   co- ordination   due   to   the  
introduction  of formal  agreements  with specific safeguard  conditions;
- firms   that   use   contracts   for   exchanges   can   undergo   variation   in 
transaction   conditions   established   in   the   agreements   (price 
incentives);
- vertically   integrated   firms   do   not   register   any   variation   in   the 
governance  of transactions  as they are already  internally safeguarded.
Firms,   by   adopting   voluntary   traceability,   can   enjoy   many   different  
benefits  related  to  food  safety,  food  quality  and  efficiency  of  vertical 
exchanges.  Furthermore,  traceability also represents  a strategic choice for 
firms   as   it   guarantees   specific   quality  standards   and  can   respond   to 
consumer  demand  concerning  food  safety,  even  though  a critical  point  
can   be   seen   to   be   the   communication,   to   the   consumer,   of   the  
characteristics  of voluntary  traceability.
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